Abstract
Truth and interpretation in ethnography (part 1): Tracking clues with marginalized
groups and uniformed professions
This essay is the first part of a reaction to Beuving’s discussion on evidence
and truth in ethnography (KWALON 74). Gigengack stresses that ethnography
is inferential and involves interpretation work. Whereas social
scientists may shy away from “truth,” and prefer “reality,” philosophies
of truth illuminate empirical ethnography. Taking the Goffman/Mead
controversies as histories of truth, Gigengack discusses created, relative,
powerful, and holistic truths on the basis of these ethnographies. It brings
Gigengack to a critique of functionalist-empiricist ethnography, and to point
out the subjectivist and objectivist fallacies in the ethnographic practice
of making truths through social facts.
groups and uniformed professions
This essay is the first part of a reaction to Beuving’s discussion on evidence
and truth in ethnography (KWALON 74). Gigengack stresses that ethnography
is inferential and involves interpretation work. Whereas social
scientists may shy away from “truth,” and prefer “reality,” philosophies
of truth illuminate empirical ethnography. Taking the Goffman/Mead
controversies as histories of truth, Gigengack discusses created, relative,
powerful, and holistic truths on the basis of these ethnographies. It brings
Gigengack to a critique of functionalist-empiricist ethnography, and to point
out the subjectivist and objectivist fallacies in the ethnographic practice
of making truths through social facts.
| Translated title of the contribution | Truth and interpretation in ethnography (part 1): Tracking clues with marginalized groups and uniformed professions |
|---|---|
| Original language | Dutch |
| Pages (from-to) | 161-175 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | KWALON |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2021 |
Keywords
- ethnographic evidence
- truth
- interpretation
- truth as problem in the field