Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government

Thomas Schillemans; Sjors Overman; Paul Fawcett; Matthew Flinders; Magnus Fredriksson; Per Laegreid; Martino Maggetti; Yannis Papadopoulos; Kristin Rubecksen; Lise Hellebø Rykkja; Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen; Amanda Smullen; Matt Wood

doi:10.1111/gove.12547

Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government

Thomas Schillemans, Sjors Overman, Paul Fawcett, Matthew Flinders, Magnus Fredriksson, Per Laegreid, Martino Maggetti, Yannis Papadopoulos, Kristin Rubecksen, Lise Hellebø Rykkja, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen, Amanda Smullen, Matt Wood

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	893-916
Journal	Governance
Volume	34
Issue number	3
Early online date	2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12547
Publication status	Published - Jul 2021

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We would like to thank Maj Grove Jeppesen (Utrecht University) first of all, and also Daniel Bailey (University of Sheffield), Martin Moos (Aarhus University), Annbj?rg Ryssdal (University of Bergen), Manuel Quaden (Utrecht University), Amanda Waldenstr?m (University of Gothenburg), Ella Weisbrot (Australian National University) for their excellent research assistance.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. Governance published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.

Access to Document

10.1111/gove.12547Licence: CC BY

gove.12547Final published version, 2.49 MB

Cite this

Schillemans, T., Overman, S., Fawcett, P., Flinders, M., Fredriksson, M., Laegreid, P., Maggetti, M., Papadopoulos, Y., Rubecksen, K., Rykkja, L. H., Salomonsen, H. H., Smullen, A., & Wood, M. (2021). Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government. Governance, 34(3), 893-916. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12547

@article{28948e22f0a0418bbe96446992713cf9,

title = "Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government",

abstract = "The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.",

author = "Thomas Schillemans and Sjors Overman and Paul Fawcett and Matthew Flinders and Magnus Fredriksson and Per Laegreid and Martino Maggetti and Yannis Papadopoulos and Kristin Rubecksen and Rykkja, {Lise Helleb{\o}} and Salomonsen, {Heidi Houlberg} and Amanda Smullen and Matt Wood",

note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Maj Grove Jeppesen (Utrecht University) first of all, and also Daniel Bailey (University of Sheffield), Martin Moos (Aarhus University), Annbj?rg Ryssdal (University of Bergen), Manuel Quaden (Utrecht University), Amanda Waldenstr?m (University of Gothenburg), Ella Weisbrot (Australian National University) for their excellent research assistance. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The Authors. Governance published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.",

year = "2021",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1111/gove.12547",

language = "English",

volume = "34",

pages = "893--916",

journal = "Governance",

issn = "0952-1895",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "3",

}

Schillemans, T , Overman, S, Fawcett, P, Flinders, M, Fredriksson, M, Laegreid, P, Maggetti, M, Papadopoulos, Y, Rubecksen, K, Rykkja, LH, Salomonsen, HH, Smullen, A & Wood, M 2021, 'Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government', Governance, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 893-916. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12547

TY - JOUR

T1 - Understanding Felt Accountability

T2 - The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government

AU - Schillemans, Thomas

AU - Overman, Sjors

AU - Fawcett, Paul

AU - Flinders, Matthew

AU - Fredriksson, Magnus

AU - Laegreid, Per

AU - Maggetti, Martino

AU - Papadopoulos, Yannis

AU - Rubecksen, Kristin

AU - Rykkja, Lise Hellebø

AU - Salomonsen, Heidi Houlberg

AU - Smullen, Amanda

AU - Wood, Matt

N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank Maj Grove Jeppesen (Utrecht University) first of all, and also Daniel Bailey (University of Sheffield), Martin Moos (Aarhus University), Annbj?rg Ryssdal (University of Bergen), Manuel Quaden (Utrecht University), Amanda Waldenstr?m (University of Gothenburg), Ella Weisbrot (Australian National University) for their excellent research assistance. Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Authors. Governance published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.

PY - 2021/7

Y1 - 2021/7

N2 - The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.

AB - The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091430914&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/gove.12547

DO - 10.1111/gove.12547

M3 - Article

SN - 0952-1895

VL - 34

SP - 893

EP - 916

JO - Governance

JF - Governance

IS - 3

ER -

Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency‐CEO's to central government

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this