Abstract
I argue that counterpart theory is incompatible with truthmaking supervenience, the thesis that truth supervenes on what there is and how things are. I further argue that David Lewis's "qua" strategy for providing ontologically innocent and Humean-friendly truthmakers for predications faces a number of difficulties. I propose and assess various solutions to those difficulties, each of which comes at the cost of sacrificing one of the two main virtues of the qua strategy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 9821-9839 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 198 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2021 |
Keywords
- Counterpart theory
- David Lewis
- Modal realism
- Truthmaking