Abstract
Conspiracy theorists are typically sceptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philosophers have argued that, therefore, conspiracy theorists in general play an important role in modern democracies. Their scepticism may lead to the exposure of actual governmental conspiracies and strengthens institutions of open societies that control the different branches of government. This chapter argues that this optimism is misplaced. Belief in false conspiracy theories doesn’t make one interested in strong controlling institutions. On the contrary, it is not surprising that the conspiracy theorists who voted people like Trump into office don’t mind at all when the president questions the very legitimacy of such institutions.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Epistemology of Fake News |
Editors | Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree, Thomas Grundmann |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 16 |
Pages | 334-357 |
Number of pages | 24 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198863977 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 20 May 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Oxford University Press 2021.
Keywords
- Conspiracy theories
- Debunking
- Epistemological effects
- Inconsistency
- Infiltration
- Irrationality
- Trust-networks