Trust no one? The (social) epistemological consequences of belief in conspiracy theories

Michael Baurmann, Daniel Cohnitz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Conspiracy theorists are typically sceptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philosophers have argued that, therefore, conspiracy theorists in general play an important role in modern democracies. Their scepticism may lead to the exposure of actual governmental conspiracies and strengthens institutions of open societies that control the different branches of government. This chapter argues that this optimism is misplaced. Belief in false conspiracy theories doesn’t make one interested in strong controlling institutions. On the contrary, it is not surprising that the conspiracy theorists who voted people like Trump into office don’t mind at all when the president questions the very legitimacy of such institutions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Epistemology of Fake News
EditorsSven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree, Thomas Grundmann
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter16
Pages334-357
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)9780198863977
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 May 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Oxford University Press 2021.

Keywords

  • Conspiracy theories
  • Debunking
  • Epistemological effects
  • Inconsistency
  • Infiltration
  • Irrationality
  • Trust-networks

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