Abstract
Abstract. This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts
of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person
wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truthvalue
of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which
of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of)
examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension
with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from
the deliberative stance.
of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person
wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truthvalue
of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which
of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of)
examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension
with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from
the deliberative stance.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 111-128 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Philosophical Research |
Volume | 44 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2019 |
Keywords
- theoretical vs. deliberative stance
- Richard Moran
- rationality
- self-knowledge
- transparency
- alienated belief
- first-person perspective