Theory of collective mind

G. Shteynberg; J.B. Hirsh; W. Wolf; J.A. Bargh; E.J. Boothby; A.M. Colman; G. Echterhoff; M. Rossignac-Milon

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.06.009

Theory of collective mind

G. Shteynberg^*
, J.B. Hirsh
, W. Wolf
, J.A. Bargh
, E.J. Boothby
, A.M. Colman
, G. Echterhoff
, M. Rossignac-Milon

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1019-1031
Number of pages	13
Journal	Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume	27
Issue number	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2023.06.009
Publication status	Published - Nov 2023

Bibliographical note

Funding

G.S. was supported by NSF SBE Social Psychology Grant # 1749348 . G.E. was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) grant DFG EC 317/10-2 , Project Number 397530566.

Funders	Funder number
NSF SBE	1749348
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft	397530566, DFG EC 317/10-2

Keywords

collective awareness
collective consciousness
collective meta-cognition
collective rationality
team reasoning
theory of mind

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10.1016/j.tics.2023.06.009

1-s2.0-S1364661323001687-mainFinal published version, 655 KBLicence: Taverne

Cite this

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AU - Shteynberg, G.

AU - Hirsh, J.B.

AU - Wolf, W.

AU - Bargh, J.A.

AU - Boothby, E.J.

AU - Colman, A.M.

AU - Echterhoff, G.

AU - Rossignac-Milon, M.

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AB - Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees.

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KW - collective consciousness

KW - collective meta-cognition

KW - collective rationality

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M3 - Review article

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Theory of collective mind

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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Keywords

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