The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition

The ambition to decarbonize societies calls for a normative theory of just transitions. An important aspect of such a theory is to scrutinize the moral entitlements of stakeholders whose status quo expectations get frustrated in the course of sustainability transitions. The concept of legitimate expectations (LE) has been advanced as a core constituent of such a theory but has also been criticized for the conceptual confusion it attracts. In this article I address this criticism by elucidating the concept and its normative grounds. This yields two theoretical insights that are novel to the debate on LE. First, I argue that there are three different kinds of claims that go by the name of LE, whose normative grounding structures differ. Second, I argue that warranted appeals to having LE should have some degree of justificatory support, but that the degree of justification may weaken over time. Accordingly, while LE are morally weighty and give rise to pro tanto duties, they may be superseded if circumstances change. In closing, I show how this account can help to interpret and evaluate claims about transitional climate justice.