The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

Eva Van Belle; Ralf Caers; Marijke De Couck; Valentina Di Stasio; Stijn Baert

doi:10.1111/irel.12230

The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

Eva Van Belle, Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio, Stijn Baert^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Migration, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Relation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	251-274
Number of pages	24
Journal	Industrial Relations
Volume	58
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230
Publication status	Published - Apr 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 The Regents of the University of California

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10.1111/irel.12230

Industrial Relations - 2019 - Van Belle - The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral SchemeFinal published version, 327 KBLicence: Taverne

Cite this

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abstract = "We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.",

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The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

Abstract

Bibliographical note

UN SDGs

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