The Separation of Trade Powers in the US and the EU: The Case of Unilateral Instruments

In recent years, unilateral trade instruments have increasingly been put to use by policy makers across the world to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results. This development puts pressure on the rules-based international order. Against this backdrop, domestic law takes on a new significance as a crucial means to hold decision-makers to account. In this paper, I comparatively explore how in the United States and the European Union domestic law mechanisms fair in ensuring effective accountability in the context of unilateral trade instruments. I highlight a number of features of the governance frameworks of both jurisdictions that stand out, and I reflect on possible avenues of reform. In so doing, the article contributes to ongoing conversations in the US and the EU on how best to allocate decision-making powers in trade policy in an era of geoeconomics and economic coercion.