Abstract
In this paper we discuss two problems. The first is the problem whether the Second Incompleteness Theorem has foundational meaning even when applied to weak or unsound theories. The second is the problem of formulating the Second Incompleteness Theorem (G2) in a way that is both general and coordinate-free.
We will formulate a number of results that are relevant for these problems. We argue for a partial (dis)solution of the first problem.
We will formulate a number of results that are relevant for these problems. We argue for a partial (dis)solution of the first problem.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Gödel’s Disjunction |
Subtitle of host publication | the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge |
Editors | Leon Horsten, Philip Welch |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 67-90 |
Number of pages | 23 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-0-19-875959-1 |
Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- incompleteness
- intensionality
- meaning
- Second Incompleteness Theorem
- Provability Logic