Abstract
Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper
revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics
revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | UU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2003 |
Publication series
| Name | Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
|---|---|
| No. | 13 |
| Volume | 03 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2666-8238 |
Keywords
- communal liability
- tort
- ancient law
- primitive society
- group liability