Abstract
This study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a
public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets
the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability.
Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as
the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution
of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with
alternative hypothetical distributions, among which according to population shares,
the distribution favoured by a social planner and the noncooperating Nash-
Cournot distribution. By way of conclusion, a device is proposed to make the
distribution of Olympic success more equitable.
public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets
the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability.
Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as
the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution
of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with
alternative hypothetical distributions, among which according to population shares,
the distribution favoured by a social planner and the noncooperating Nash-
Cournot distribution. By way of conclusion, a device is proposed to make the
distribution of Olympic success more equitable.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Utrecht |
| Publisher | UU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Publication series
| Name | Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
|---|---|
| No. | 34 |
| Volume | 08 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2666-8238 |
Keywords
- Olympic Games
- public goods
- externalities
- social welfare
- Nash