Abstract
This paper brings together several approaches to vagueness, and ends by
suggesting a new approach. The common thread in these approaches is the crucial
role played by context. Using a single example where there is a conflict of interest
between speaker and listener, we start by treating game-theoretic rationales for
vagueness, and for the related concepts of generality and ambiguity. We argue that
the most plausible application of these models to vagueness in natural language is
one where the listener only imperfectly observes the context in which the speaker
makes her utterances. We next look at a rationale for vagueness when there is no
conflict between speaker and listener, and which is an application of Horn’s rule.
Further, we tackle the Sorites paradox. This paradox apparently violates standard
axioms of rational behaviour. Yet, once it is taken into account that vague language
is used in an appropriate context, these axioms are no longer violated. We end with
a behavioural approach to vagueness, where context directly enters agents’
preferences. In an application of prospect theory, agents think in terms of gains and
losses with respect to a reference point. Vague predicates now allow agents to
express their subjective valuations, without necessarily specifying the context.
suggesting a new approach. The common thread in these approaches is the crucial
role played by context. Using a single example where there is a conflict of interest
between speaker and listener, we start by treating game-theoretic rationales for
vagueness, and for the related concepts of generality and ambiguity. We argue that
the most plausible application of these models to vagueness in natural language is
one where the listener only imperfectly observes the context in which the speaker
makes her utterances. We next look at a rationale for vagueness when there is no
conflict between speaker and listener, and which is an application of Horn’s rule.
Further, we tackle the Sorites paradox. This paradox apparently violates standard
axioms of rational behaviour. Yet, once it is taken into account that vague language
is used in an appropriate context, these axioms are no longer violated. We end with
a behavioural approach to vagueness, where context directly enters agents’
preferences. In an application of prospect theory, agents think in terms of gains and
losses with respect to a reference point. Vague predicates now allow agents to
express their subjective valuations, without necessarily specifying the context.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Utrecht |
| Publisher | UU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |
Publication series
| Name | Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute |
|---|---|
| No. | 31 |
| Volume | 9 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2666-8238 |
Keywords
- Vagueness
- signalling games
- decision theory
- prospect theory