Abstract
This paper examines the role of soft law in EU-Canada trade relations, focusing on its implications for democratic oversight. As legally binding agreements like CETA coexist with informal non-binding agreements such as the Digital Partnership and Green Alliance, new challenges arise for democratic control. The European Parliament's limited role in overseeing these soft law instruments
highlights a significant accountability gap. The analysis delves into specific cases of soft law application, assessing their legal and political impacts, and questioning the adequacy of existing democratic scrutiny mechanisms. The paper argues for institutional reforms to enhance parliamentary involvement, ensuring that the proliferation of soft law does not undermine democratic governance within the EU. It calls for a re-evaluation of the balance between formal and informal law-making in EU trade policy, proposing a path toward greater legislative oversight.
highlights a significant accountability gap. The analysis delves into specific cases of soft law application, assessing their legal and political impacts, and questioning the adequacy of existing democratic scrutiny mechanisms. The paper argues for institutional reforms to enhance parliamentary involvement, ensuring that the proliferation of soft law does not undermine democratic governance within the EU. It calls for a re-evaluation of the balance between formal and informal law-making in EU trade policy, proposing a path toward greater legislative oversight.
| Original language | English |
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| Number of pages | 14 |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2024 |