@inbook{cb5b9eda27c9484294bdf15709a9f059,
title = "Simple Semantics for Logics of Indeterminate Epistemic Closure",
abstract = "According to Jago (2014a), logical omniscience is really part of a deeper paradox. He develops an epistemic logic with principles of indeterminate closure to solve this paradox, but his official semantics is difficult to navigate, it is motivated in part by substantive metaphysics, and the logic is not axiomatized. In this paper, I simplify this epistemic logic by adapting the hyperintensional semantic framework of Sedl{\'a}r (2021). My first goal is metaphysical neutrality. The solution to the epistemic paradox should not require appeal to a metaphysics of truth-makers, situations, or impossible worlds, by contrast with Jago{\textquoteright}s official semantics. My second goal is to elaborate on the proof theory. I show how to axiomatize a family of logics with principles of indeterminate epistemic closure.",
keywords = "logic, knowledge, hyperintensionality",
author = "Caret, {Colin R.}",
year = "2022",
month = aug,
day = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "2021",
series = "The Logica Yearbook",
publisher = "College Publications",
pages = "37--55",
editor = "Sedl{\'a}r, {Igor }",
booktitle = "The Logica Yearbook 2021",
address = "United Kingdom",
}