Abstract
Naming and shaming offenders is often considered an effective strategy to improve compliance. Shaming exposes an offender to condemnation by a community of stakeholders. The threat of negative publicity, reputational damage and social disapproval is perceived as a sanction, and can in theory be more powerful than a formal legal sanction. This chapter asks to what extent naming and shaming can improve compliance. It takes stock of extant empirical evidence on the effect of shaming policies on regulatory compliance and identifies conditions for shaming to affect compliance. The complex relationship between ‘naming and shaming’ and compliance makes it difficult to predict and control the various effects of shaming sanctions. The chapter concludes that the unpredictability of effects makes ‘naming and shaming’ a risky tool for regulators. A theory about naming and shaming should differentiate among types of offender, shaming agent and social context.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance |
| Editors | Benjamin van Rooij, Daniel Sokol |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Chapter | 30 |
| Pages | 438-450 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781108759458 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781108477123 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 2021 |
Publication series
| Name | Cambridge Law Handbooks |
|---|
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Keywords
- Compliance
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