Abstract
In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisation choices under which self-reference can be adequately formalised in arithmetic. In particular, we study self-referential numberings, which immediately provide a strong notion of self-reference even for expressively weak languages. The results of this paper suggest that the question whether truly self-referential reasoning can be formalised in arithmetic is more sensitive to the underlying coding apparatus than usually believed. As a case study, we show how this sensitivity affects the formal study of certain principles of self-referential truth.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 385 - 424 |
Journal | Review of Symbolic Logic |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021 Lippincott Williams and Wilkins. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Arithmetic
- Gödel numberings
- Self-reference
- Truth-theories