Abstract
In this sequel to Self-reference in arithmetic I we continue our discussion of the question: What does it mean for a sentence of arithmetic to ascribe to itself a property? We investigate how the properties of the supposedly self-referential sentences depend on the chosen coding, the formulae expressing the properties and the way a fixed point for the expressing formulae are obtained. In this second part we look at some further examples. In particular, we study sentences apparently expressing their Rosser-provability, their own (Formula presented.)-truth or their own (Formula presented.)-truth. Finally we offer an assessment of the results of both papers.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 692-712 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Review of Symbolic Logic |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2014 |
Keywords
- self-reference
- arithmetization
- intentsionality