Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their respective advantages and disadvantages, and thereby indicate avenues for future research.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbere12901
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
JournalPhilosophy Compass
Volume18
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors. Philosophy Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Funding

For helpful feedback, I would like to thank Andreas Bengtson, Stephen Darwall, the members of the research group “Kant, Kantianism, and Morality” at the University of Groningen, and two anonymous reviewers. Financial support came from grant VC.GW17.059 from the Dutch Research Council (NWO), and from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) in the context of the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities “Human Abilities”, grant number 409272951. 1 For helpful feedback, I would like to thank Andreas Bengtson, Stephen Darwall, the members of the research group “Kant, Kantianism, and Morality” at the University of Groningen, and two anonymous reviewers. Financial support came from grant VC.GW17.059 from the Dutch Research Council (NWO), and from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) in the context of the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities “Human Abilities”, grant number 409272951.

FundersFunder number
Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities409272951
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Rijksuniversiteit GroningenVC.GW17.059
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek

    Keywords

    • Commands
    • Conceptions
    • Demands
    • Reasons

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this