Abstract
We take another look at Reichenbach’s 1920 conversion to conventionalism, with
a special eye to the background of his ‘conventionality of distant simultaneity’
thesis. We argue that elements of Reichenbach earlier neo-Kantianism can still be
discerned in his later work and, related to this, that his conventionalism should be
seen as situated at the level of global theory choice. This is contrary to many of
Reichenbach’s own statements, in which he declares that his conventionalism is a
consequence of the arbitrariness of coordinative defi nitions.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The present situation in the philosophy of science |
Editors | F. Stadler |
Place of Publication | Dorcrecht [etc.] |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 315-333 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Publication status | Published - 18 Dec 2008 |