Abstract
Most planning theories are based on the assumption that there is a homogenous public interest. However, planning agencies are driven by multiple and conflicting interests in practice. This article conceptualises and empirically investigates these interests in an “extreme case” of active public land policy: the Dutch state selling Amsterdam’s Bijlmer prison. Three types of dilemmas or conflicting interests that arose in the Bijlmer prison case are examined: prioritising price or social value, organizing a private transaction or a public tender, and choosing flexibility or certainty. Although these are matters of principle, subjective, pragmatic and context-specific choices determine the ultimate balance.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 248-264 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Planning Theory and Practice |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | Jan 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This work was supported by RVB (Rijksvastgoedbedrijf), which is the Central Government Real Estate Agency in the Netherlands.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Keywords
- Public entrepreneurship
- contracting
- land markets
- public choice