Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

Nima Motamed; Arie Soeteman; Simon Rey; Ulle Endriss

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19

Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

Nima Motamed, Arie Soeteman, Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We put forward a formal model of participatory budgeting where projects can incur costs with respect to several different resources, such as money, energy, or emission allowances. We generalise several well-known mechanisms from the usual single-resource setting to this multi-resource setting and analyse their algorithmic efficiency, the extent to which they are immune to strategic manipulation, and the degree of proportional representation they can guarantee. We also prove a general impossibility theorem establishing the incompatibility of proportionality and strategyproofness for this model.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Multi-Agent Systems
Subtitle of host publication	19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Düsseldorf, Germany, September 14–16, 2022, Proceedings
Editors	D. Baumeister, J. Rothe
Place of Publication	Cham
Publisher	Springer
Pages	330-347
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-031-20614-6
ISBN (Print)	978-3-031-20613-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2022

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	13442
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Keywords

Computational social choice ·
Participatory budgeting

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19

978-3-031-20614-6_19Final published version, 336 KBLicence: Taverne

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Motamed, N., Soeteman, A., Rey, S., & Endriss, U. (2022). Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources. In D. Baumeister, & J. Rothe (Eds.), Multi-Agent Systems: 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Düsseldorf, Germany, September 14–16, 2022, Proceedings (pp. 330-347). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 13442). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19

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Motamed, N, Soeteman, A, Rey, S & Endriss, U 2022, Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources. in D Baumeister & J Rothe (eds), Multi-Agent Systems: 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Düsseldorf, Germany, September 14–16, 2022, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 13442, Springer, Cham, pp. 330-347. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19

Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources. / Motamed, Nima; Soeteman, Arie; Rey, Simon et al.
Multi-Agent Systems: 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Düsseldorf, Germany, September 14–16, 2022, Proceedings. ed. / D. Baumeister; J. Rothe. Cham: Springer, 2022. p. 330-347 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 13442).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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T1 - Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

AU - Motamed, Nima

AU - Soeteman, Arie

AU - Rey, Simon

AU - Endriss, Ulle

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N2 - We put forward a formal model of participatory budgeting where projects can incur costs with respect to several different resources, such as money, energy, or emission allowances. We generalise several well-known mechanisms from the usual single-resource setting to this multi-resource setting and analyse their algorithmic efficiency, the extent to which they are immune to strategic manipulation, and the degree of proportional representation they can guarantee. We also prove a general impossibility theorem establishing the incompatibility of proportionality and strategyproofness for this model.

AB - We put forward a formal model of participatory budgeting where projects can incur costs with respect to several different resources, such as money, energy, or emission allowances. We generalise several well-known mechanisms from the usual single-resource setting to this multi-resource setting and analyse their algorithmic efficiency, the extent to which they are immune to strategic manipulation, and the degree of proportional representation they can guarantee. We also prove a general impossibility theorem establishing the incompatibility of proportionality and strategyproofness for this model.

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KW - Participatory budgeting

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CY - Cham

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Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

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