On the Humphrey objection to modal realism

M.J. De

doi:10.1163/18756735-000032

On the Humphrey objection to modal realism

M.J. De

University of Miami

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Abstract: An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one's modal properties without being concerned about the properties one's other-worldly counterparts have. I assess this objection in a variety of forms, and then provide my own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, I consider two potential answers to the objection so understood and conclude that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	159-179
Journal	Grazer Philosophische Studien
Volume	95
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000032
Publication status	Published - 2018

Keywords

modal realism
modality
Humphrey objection

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10.1163/18756735-000032

Cite this

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AB - Abstract: An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one's modal properties without being concerned about the properties one's other-worldly counterparts have. I assess this objection in a variety of forms, and then provide my own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, I consider two potential answers to the objection so understood and conclude that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.

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KW - modality

KW - Humphrey objection

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DO - 10.1163/18756735-000032

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JF - Grazer Philosophische Studien

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On the Humphrey objection to modal realism

Abstract

Keywords

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