On certainty, Left Wittgensteinianism and conceptual change

What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point- and need-based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in On Certainty, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism-driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the reason-based contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept-users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof.