Norms2: Norms About Norms

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


In this paper, I outline and defend the view that variations in compliance levels with one and the same norm represent different norms about following norms. In support of this claim, I first argue that classic game-theoretic accounts, which define norms as Nash equilibria of noncooperative games, typically consider variations in compliance levels as separate norms. After that, I suggest a more fine-grained, game-theoretic distinction that accounts for degrees of compliance with the same norm and I show how to incorporate such an account into a psychological framework. Finally, the paper examines what given degrees of compliance can reveal about the dynamics underlying the process of norm change. I will argue that they are indicators of different reactions to the introduction of new norms.
Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)2673 - 2694
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2023

Cite this