Non-normative logical pluralism and the revenge of the normativity objection

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Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to ϕ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2⁠. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject ϕ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept ϕ or suspend judgment about ϕ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-177
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Issue number278
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020


  • Logical pluralism
  • Normativity objection
  • Collapse problem
  • Normativity


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