Nash Equilibria in the Response Strategy of Correlated Games

A. D. Correia*, H. T.C. Stoof

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume that the players make decisions based only on the payoff matrix, a more detailed modeling is necessary if we also want to consider the influence of correlations on the decisions of the players. We therefore extend here the existing framework of correlated strategies by giving the players the freedom to respond to the instructions of the correlation device by probabilistically following or not following its suggestions. This creates a new type of games that we call “correlated games”. The associated response strategies that can solve these games turn out to have a rich structure of Nash equilibria that goes beyond the correlated equilibrium and pure or mixed-strategy solutions and also gives better payoffs in certain cases. We here determine these Nash equilibria for all possible correlated Snowdrift games and we find these solutions to be describable by Ising models in thermal equilibrium. We believe that our approach paves the way to a study of correlations in games that uncovers the existence of interesting underlying interaction mechanisms, without compromising the independence of the players.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2352
Number of pages8
JournalScientific Reports
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Feb 2019

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