Abstract
This paper discusses the viability of claims of mathematical beauty, asking whether mathematical beauty, if indeed there is such a thing, should be conceived of as a sub-variety of the more commonplace kinds of beauty: natural, artistic, and human beauty; or, rather, as a substantive variety in its own right. If the latter, then it does not show itself in perceptual awareness—because this is what characterises the commonplace kinds of beauty—and mathematical beauty, per the argument, is not amongst these. I conclude that the reference to mathematical beauty merely expresses the awe in the mathematician about the intricate complexities and simplicity of certain proofs, theorems, or mathematical “objects”.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 249-267 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Philosophical Investigations |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |