Limits of Détente or Limits of Democracy? Belgium, the Netherlands, and NATO's Dual-Track Decision: 1977–1979

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This article highlights the Belgian and Dutch roles in the so-called dual-track decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1979. At NATO headquarters on 12 December 1979, the leaders of the allied member-states unanimously agreed to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in five West European countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands. In the lead-up to this meeting, interactions among the three leading NATO members—the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany—produced a unique situation in which Belgium and the Netherlands gained key roles in the decision-making process. The two small countries challenged the fragile NATO consensus surrounding the dual-track decision and even jeopardized endorsement of the final agreement. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, public opinion was clearly against the deployments, and so were many members of the two countries’ legislatures. In each country, moreover, a major ruling coalition party insisted that NATO should make a positive deployment decision only after all arms control options were gone. Yet, despite these reservations, both countries eventually fell into line and endorsed the decision.</jats:p>