Abstract
Social relationships can be beneficial for various reasons. For example, people find
jobs through their social contacts, and researchers connect with each other to cooperate
on projects. Within these networks of relations, actors maintain different positions,
which can influence their outcomes. Therefore, they arguably try to maneuver
themselves into beneficial network positions. People nowadays use the term "networking"
to describe such behavior. Linking with others does not only have an effect on
an actor's own position and outcomes, but also affects the positions and therefore the
outcomes of others in the network. It is often assumed that actors in such complex
and dynamic network situations neglect subsequent decisions of other people: actors
are myopic. In contrast, standard rationality models would assume actors to be perfectly
rational and in that sense perfectly farsighted: actors are able to foresee all
possible reactions of others. This assumption also seems unrealistic, as humans are
unlikely to be capable to perform such complex cognitive tasks in a dynamic network.
However, if actors are not only looking at their immediate gain, but anticipate the reactions
of others at least to a limited extent, this already might have consequences
for the formation of social networks. The research presented here examines systematically
how individual behavior, in terms of actors' farsightedness, changes the formation
of social networks. Computer simulations are used to predict model outcomes,
and these predictions are tested experimentally. Furthermore, the experimental
data on individual decisions are used to study heterogeneity of actors in terms of their
ability to look ahead.
Original language | English |
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Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
Awarding Institution |
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Supervisors/Advisors |
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Award date | 9 Sept 2013 |
Publisher | |
Print ISBNs | 978-90-393-6010-1 |
Publication status | Published - 9 Sept 2013 |