Kant and the Second Person

Janis Schaab*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

According to Stephen Darwall's second-personal account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Immanuel Kant's moral theory. Critics object that the second-personal account abandons central tenets of Kant's system. I respond to the three main challenges that critics offer by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the second-personal account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant's moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received scant attention. In particular, it motivates a fresh perspective on the relationship between respect, persons, and the law.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)494 - 513
JournalJournal of the American Philosophical Association
Volume7
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Oct 2021

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