TY - JOUR
T1 - Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory
AU - Dalbey, Bryce
AU - Saad, Bradford
N1 - Funding Information:
Funding was provided by the European Research Council (Grant Number 726251), John Templeton Foundation (Grant Number 61516), Sentience Institute, University of Texas at Austin, and Universiteit Utrecht. The views expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of funders.
Funding Information:
For helpful feedback, we are grateful to Brian Cutter, Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay, anonymous reviewers, and participants in the 2019 Flash Conference at UT Austin. For helpful discussion of related work, we are grateful to Michelle Montague, Jon Morgan, Adam Pautz, Mark Sainsbury, David Sosa, and Galen Strawson.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s).
PY - 2022/8/17
Y1 - 2022/8/17
N2 - We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience “missing shades”.
AB - We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience “missing shades”.
KW - Intentionalism
KW - Missing shades
KW - Naturalism
KW - Perceptual variation
KW - Phenomenal externalism
KW - Phenomenal structure
KW - Tracking intentionalism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85136108678&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-022-03829-1
DO - 10.1007/s11229-022-03829-1
M3 - Article
C2 - 35993008
SN - 0039-7857
VL - 200
SP - 1
EP - 29
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
IS - 5
M1 - 348
ER -