Abstract
This dissertation presents five chapters about institutional choice in the area of federalism and European integration. The methods used and the perspective adopted roughly correspond to what is known as “political economy”: the study of politics with methodology from economics (game theory and econometrics), and the study of how economics and politics interact. Substantively, the focus is on the impact of formal political rules in federations on outcomes such as the division of power and the durability of the federation, and on the choice over such rules, i.e. institutional choice.
Content
Chapter 1. Playing with the Rules: Institutions and Institutional Choice
Chapter 2. Choosing an Informative Agenda Setter: the Appointment of the European Commission
Chapter 3. Making Exit Costly but Efficient: The Political Economy of Exit Clauses and Secession
Chapter 4. Heterogeneity, Vetoes and Exit Clauses in Federal Systems
Chapter 5. Subsidiarity in the European Union: When Do National Parliaments Send Reasoned Opinions?
Content
Chapter 1. Playing with the Rules: Institutions and Institutional Choice
Chapter 2. Choosing an Informative Agenda Setter: the Appointment of the European Commission
Chapter 3. Making Exit Costly but Efficient: The Political Economy of Exit Clauses and Secession
Chapter 4. Heterogeneity, Vetoes and Exit Clauses in Federal Systems
Chapter 5. Subsidiarity in the European Union: When Do National Parliaments Send Reasoned Opinions?
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Awarding Institution |
|
| Supervisors/Advisors |
|
| Award date | 20 Nov 2017 |
| Place of Publication | Leuven, Belgium |
| Publication status | Published - 20 Nov 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |