Abstract
G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 443-462 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 3-4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |