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Heterogeneity and cooperation in climate change mitigation: An experimental approach to common-pool resource games

  • Utrecht University
  • University of Hamburg

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The collective action problem associated with CO2 reduction presents a global challenge that requires cooperation among actors. Two factors are often argued to hinder successful cooperation in this context: endowment heterogeneity and the time delay between environmentally harmful actions and their consequences. This study examines the effects of endowment heterogeneity and delayed feedback on cooperation in common-pool resource management at the individual and group levels. Using a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game in a laboratory experiment, we simulated CO2 emission dynamics under various conditions of heterogeneity and time-varying feedback. The results highlight that cooperation in common-pool resource dilemmas is shaped through complex micro-macro interdependence. Endowment heterogeneity primarily affects the internal distribution of behavior within groups rather than aggregate outcomes. Low-endowment participants tend to emit less, while high-endowment participants tend to emit more, indicating that endowment heterogeneity affects emissions in opposite directions across group members, largely offsetting each other at the group level. This suggests that heterogeneity may redistribute contributions to mitigation efforts within groups. In contrast, delayed feedback primarily operates by influencing how individuals process and respond to social information. Feedback timing affects how participants react to prior group behavior and the informational conditions under which conditional cooperation is expressed. At the group level, this translates into a modest but detectable effect, suggesting that feedback structure can influence collective outcomes even when individual-level effects are limited. This implies that the determinants of cooperation in CPR settings cannot be fully understood by looking only at either the micro or the macro level.

Original languageEnglish
JournalRationality and Society
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Jul 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2026. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 13 - Climate Action
    SDG 13 Climate Action

Keywords

  • COreduction
  • common-pool resource game
  • delayed feedback
  • endowment heterogeneity
  • sustainable cooperation

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