Governance of Banks in an Era of Regulatory Change and Declining Public Confidence

Andrea Minto, Roger McCormick

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademic

    Abstract

    Corporate governance reforms have become more intrusive for
    banks than might be thought appropriate for “ordinary corporates”. “Heavier”
    regulation in this area is justified by the public interest at stake in bank activity
    and the risk to the public interest if a bank is allowed to fail (and the cost to the
    public of saving a bank from failure). The public interest (and the interest of all
    stakeholders) also has implications for the scope of the duty of care of bank
    directors.
    Conventional concepts of corporate governance address traditional risk
    areas in banking activity as well as tensions such as the “agency problem” and
    the need for oversight by directors of senior management. However, a new set of issues related to public trust has been triggered by the LIBOR scandal and
    most banks, and many commentators, profess a desire to “restore public trust”
    and address acknowledged shortcomings in their approach to ethical questions
    and the soundness of their corporate culture. A related, but different, set of
    challenges arises as a result.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)6-45
    Number of pages41
    JournalLaw and Economics Yearly Review
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

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