Gesichter sprechen an. Eine philosophische Betrachtungsweise des Gesichtsausdrucks (und der kosmetischen Chirurgie)

English abstract A standard conception of facial expression locates it (the expression) in a face out there, open for closer inspection if need be; and views it as expressing some hidden inner life, centrally the emotions—sometimes requiring a measure of interpretation. The expression is supposedly controllable, so that one can use it to mislead onlookers, and to hide one’s real motives—and such hiding may be unmasked, again, by looking better. Against the background of this seemingly intuitively plausible view we deem it unproblematic if one were to decide to apply cosmetic surgery to the physiological characteristics of the face—since this would not affect the inner life expressed, and therefore would not affect the expression, and it would easily fit the use we already make of our faces (of hiding and misleading). I submit that this conception is mistaken, and argue that facial expression consists in a reciprocal process of addressing. Gazing at the other’s face is co- constitutive for that face’s expression. The (moral and legal) argument that deciding for cosmetic surgery is the sole prerogative of the “physical owner” of the face ignores the value of the reciprocity. Cosmetic surgery, I submit, is not just an issue for the individual’s freedom of expression, but is a profoundly social issue.