From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

A. Visser

doi:10.1093/logcom/exz004

From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

A. Visser

OFR - Theoretical Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	595-604
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Logic and Computation
Volume	29
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exz004
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2019

Keywords

formal theories
consistency
self-reference
truth

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10.1093/logcom/exz004

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From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

Abstract

Keywords

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