Abstract
The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new classification of executive measures including new modalities of control. Hitherto, EU administrative rule-making typically relied on the comitology system in which member state civil servants discuss and vote on executive measures proposed by the Commission, which the Commission could only formally adopt if the comitology committee would not veto its measure.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, a new parallel system has been set up as an alternative to comitology: the delegated acts system. This system is meant for quasi-legislative measures adopted by the Commission, and allocates veto power to the European Parliament and the Council. The comitology committees continue to exist but are ripped of their vote. The Council fears that the absence of formal voting will tempt the Commission to ignore member state input and put pressure on the Commission to provide a more privileged position to member state experts. Thus far, the Commission resisted this pressure.
This paper investigates to what degree these fears are justified. To what degree did the transition from comitology committees (with formal voting rights) to expert groups for delegated acts (without voting rights) affect the workings of the expert groups? On the basis of interviews with member state experts who participate both in expert groups as well as in comitology committees, we demonstrate how patterns of deliberation and negotiation differ between the two settings.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, a new parallel system has been set up as an alternative to comitology: the delegated acts system. This system is meant for quasi-legislative measures adopted by the Commission, and allocates veto power to the European Parliament and the Council. The comitology committees continue to exist but are ripped of their vote. The Council fears that the absence of formal voting will tempt the Commission to ignore member state input and put pressure on the Commission to provide a more privileged position to member state experts. Thus far, the Commission resisted this pressure.
This paper investigates to what degree these fears are justified. To what degree did the transition from comitology committees (with formal voting rights) to expert groups for delegated acts (without voting rights) affect the workings of the expert groups? On the basis of interviews with member state experts who participate both in expert groups as well as in comitology committees, we demonstrate how patterns of deliberation and negotiation differ between the two settings.
Original language | English |
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Publication status | Unpublished - 5 Nov 2015 |
Event | NIG 2015 - Nijmegen, Netherlands Duration: 5 Nov 2015 → 6 Nov 2015 |
Conference
Conference | NIG 2015 |
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Country/Territory | Netherlands |
City | Nijmegen |
Period | 5/11/15 → 6/11/15 |