Abstract
One of the main objectives of EU trade policy is to establish wider protection for its
regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). In spite of US
opposition, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red
line in recent trade agreements. A key piece to the puzzle of this success is that
whereas the literature has typically treated trade and non-trade issues as a dichotomy, GI protection encompasses both trade and non-trade aspects. In the EU, trade
agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval.
Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article develops and tests a theory of GI protection
using new data on GIs listed for protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It
finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because
of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic, cultural and political
factors shape and enable EU policy exports through trade agreements.
regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). In spite of US
opposition, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red
line in recent trade agreements. A key piece to the puzzle of this success is that
whereas the literature has typically treated trade and non-trade issues as a dichotomy, GI protection encompasses both trade and non-trade aspects. In the EU, trade
agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval.
Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article develops and tests a theory of GI protection
using new data on GIs listed for protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It
finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because
of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic, cultural and political
factors shape and enable EU policy exports through trade agreements.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 979-1005 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Review of International Political Economy |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 24 Nov 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:I would like to thank anonymous reviewers and Andreas Dür, Tobias Hofmann, Amy Pond, Philippe van Gruisen, and seminar participants at KU Leuven, Utrecht University, PEIO 2019, AES 2019, and EPSA 2019 for their comments on earlier drafts. In addition, I would like to thank Gero Laurenz Höhn, Herman Lelieveldt, Charles van Marrewijk, Francesco Nicoli, Jo Swinnen, Calvin Thrall and Hylke Vandenbussche for their suggestions related to this project. Finally, I want to thank the GI producers and government officials who have spoken to me about GI policy. All shortcomings remain my own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Keywords
- Trade agreements
- geographical indications
- intellectual property
- TRIPS
- European Union
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver