Effects of regulatory instruments and enforcement styles on citizen trust

This report presents the preliminary analysis of the six experiments on citizens’ trust conducted as part of the work package WP5. The experiments test the effects of regulatory enforcement style on citizens’ trust in both regulators and regulatees in six countries: the Netherlands, Germany, Israel, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium, and in three domains: food safety, finance, and data protection. In this document we first outline the structure and rationale of the experiments. We then report on the main analysis testing the effects of three dimensions of regulatory enforcement: formalism, coerciveness, and accommodation on citizens’ trust in regulators and regulatees in the three domains. Finally, we present a covariate analysis exploring the potential effects of a range of variables on the relationship between regulatory enforcement style and citizens’ trust.
The findings show variations in the observed levels of trust: citizens’ trust in both regulatees and regulators in the three regulated sectors is the highest in the Netherlands and Norway, while the lowest in Israel. Regulators are consistently seen as more trustworthy than regulatees; and trust in the data protection and food safety sector is generally somewhat higher than trust in the finance sector.
When it comes to the effects of the three dimensions of enforcement style on citizens’ trust, we observe a rather mixed picture. We find very limited evidence that the degree of formalism displayed by the regulator affects citizens’ trust in either the regulator or the regulatees. The evidence with regard to the positive effect of coerciveness on citizens’ trust is stronger in the case of regulators, but less so with regard to the regulatees. The level of accommodation affects the levels of trust in regulators and regulatees in different ways in different contexts.
We find very limited evidence that enforcement in general increases trust in either regulators or regulatees. Curiously, we observe that the enforcement effects on trust are consistently stronger in the countries where the overall levels of trust are comparatively lower: Israel and Denmark. This suggests the presence of a ceiling effect.
Finally, the covariate analysis indicated a consistent and positive relationship between generalized trust, preferences about (stronger) regulation, and knowledge of the work of the regulator with the levels of trust citizens place both in the regulator and the regulatees in the three investigated sectors.