Abstract
From its beginning, NATO has been a defensive alliance. It strove to protect Western Europe in 1951 from a highly uncertain future. The greatest threat to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty was not necessarily war, but the undermining of its governments and social structures that were at odds with the Soviet empire. In addition to the nation-states, NATO itself was a target of Soviet subversion, existing as a threat to Soviet expansion and influence.
When the military headquarters of NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, was established in 1951, Soviet intelligence operations found a new and important target. Protecting the military headquarters in its infancy was a critical component of success. From the beginning, 450th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment (DET) was assigned to the new headquarters to protect it from espionage, sabotage, subversion and the vicissitudes of Soviet conspiracy. This unit would become the only operational counterintelligence organization in an international organization. Its experiences and struggles provide insight into the difficulties of conducting counterintelligence, or intelligence in general, in an alliance or international organization. What can be found in the operations of the 450th CIC DET is both a refutation of the concept that intelligence within an international organization is new, and a confirmation that many of the issues with international intelligence operations and sharing are not new. The problems faced by the 450th CIC DET find their start in the vague nature of the unit’s very beginning. With no real doctrine to rely on, a lack of operational supervision, and endemic manning issues, the 450th in many ways had to create their own way, as the mission they had embarked on had never been done before. The central thesis of this research is the 450th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment as a model for international counterintelligence cooperation, an example of the human factor of international intelligence liaison, and the criticality of diplomacy in intelligence relationships.
When the military headquarters of NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, was established in 1951, Soviet intelligence operations found a new and important target. Protecting the military headquarters in its infancy was a critical component of success. From the beginning, 450th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment (DET) was assigned to the new headquarters to protect it from espionage, sabotage, subversion and the vicissitudes of Soviet conspiracy. This unit would become the only operational counterintelligence organization in an international organization. Its experiences and struggles provide insight into the difficulties of conducting counterintelligence, or intelligence in general, in an alliance or international organization. What can be found in the operations of the 450th CIC DET is both a refutation of the concept that intelligence within an international organization is new, and a confirmation that many of the issues with international intelligence operations and sharing are not new. The problems faced by the 450th CIC DET find their start in the vague nature of the unit’s very beginning. With no real doctrine to rely on, a lack of operational supervision, and endemic manning issues, the 450th in many ways had to create their own way, as the mission they had embarked on had never been done before. The central thesis of this research is the 450th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment as a model for international counterintelligence cooperation, an example of the human factor of international intelligence liaison, and the criticality of diplomacy in intelligence relationships.
Original language | English |
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Award date | 28 Nov 2017 |
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Publication status | Published - 28 Nov 2017 |
Keywords
- counterintelligence
- NATO
- intelligence
- cooperation
- diplomacy
- Cold War
- military
- espionage