Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

Bruno Baranek; L. Musolff; Vitezslav Titl

Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

Bruno Baranek, L. Musolff, Vitezslav Titl

Research output: Working paper › Academic

Abstract

Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.

Original language	English
Publisher	USE Research Institute
Number of pages	38
Publication status	Published - 2021

Publication series

Name	U.S.E. Working Paper Series
Publisher	USE Research Institute
No.	11
Volume	21
ISSN (Electronic)	2666-8238

Keywords

Public procurement
Collusion
Online markets

Access to Document

LEG_USE_WP_21-11Final published version, 979 KBLicence: Unspecified

Cite this

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AU - Musolff, L.

AU - Titl, Vitezslav

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N2 - Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.

AB - Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.

KW - Public procurement

KW - Collusion

KW - Online markets

M3 - Working paper

T3 - U.S.E. Working Paper Series

BT - Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

PB - USE Research Institute

ER -

Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

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