Covenants in convertible bonds: boon or boilerplate?

Marie Dutordoir, Xu Liang, Kostas Pappas, Cheng Zeng

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102392
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Issue numberJune 2023
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Externally publishedYes


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