Cooperation and the common enemy effect

Research output: Working paperAcademic

Abstract

This paper presents a game-theoretic rationale for the beneficial effect of a
common enemy on cooperation. In a defence game against a common
natural threat, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the sum of
the players’ defensive efforts. The game therefore takes the form of a
prisoner’s dilemma, leading to free-riding. When the same defence game is
played against a common enemy, the value of the public good of defence is
equal to the smallest defensive effort. The game now takes the form of a
stag hunt, so that a cooperative equilibrium becomes possible. For this
reason, an informed and benevolent government may not want to inform
the public that it is facing a common natural threat rather than a common
enemy. At the same time, the common enemy has an incentive to mimic
nature, and perform only random rather than targeted attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationUtrecht
PublisherUU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute
Number of pages17
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameDiscussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute
No.24
Volume12
ISSN (Electronic)2666-8238

Keywords

  • Common Enemy Effect
  • Defence Games
  • Prisoner’s Dilemma
  • Stag Hunt

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