Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation

Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient
concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently
undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop
this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging
technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark
‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the
question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a
CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between
three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual
misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions,
its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to
prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken
in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual
scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.