@techreport{bc222b4058fc4c1dba61cfc1b6d48784,
title = "Competing first-price and second-price auctions",
abstract = "This paper theoretically investigates which auctions competing sellers select when they can choose between first-price and second-price auctions, and when risk averse bidders endogenously enter one of the auctions. We first consider bidders{\textquoteright} entry decisions between exogenously given auctions, and find that there exists a symmetric entry equilibrium that is characterized by a mixed strategy, which depends on the bidders{\textquoteright} degree of absolute risk aversion. In a next step, we endogenize the sellers{\textquoteright} choice of auctions. We show that competing sellers have a dominant strategy to select first-price auctions if bidders exhibit nondecreasing absolute risk aversion. If bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, however, other equilibria exist in which sellers select second-price auctions as well.",
keywords = "Auctions, Entry decisions, Risk aversion",
author = "J.M.J. Delnoij and \{De Jaegher\}, K.J.M.",
year = "2016",
month = sep,
language = "English",
series = "U.S.E. Discussion paper series",
publisher = "UU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute",
number = "07",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "UU USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute",
}