Compensatory justice and basic income

In the economist's view on CJ, only the workers on the margin are exactly compensated in welfare terms for their loss of utility compared to their next best alternative, whereas all nonmarginal workers (perhaps liking their jobs) are being overcompensated. This outcome is, however, more efficient than what would follow from an objective or balancing approach to CJ. The chief criterion to be used to assess whether the conditions of CJ are met or not is whether people have the real choice or no other choice when they take a job. Having a real choice requires an acceptable alternative. If workers lack the real freedom of choice, the prospect of CJ is threatened. The best guarantee for CJ is a decent fallback position readily accessible to all. According to this view, with the emphasis on the required conditions, it is easier to make comparisons of CJ between different schemes of social security than to measure the degree of CJ. It has been argued here that although the objective and balancing approaches may have coherent conceptions of CJ, they are infeasible and impracticable. The economist's view on CJ is the most practical conception of CJ: CJ is achieved when each job's rate of pay exactly compensates the worker on the margin for the disutility suffered compared to her next best alternative. However, this criterion is incomplete, since it leaves out what the alternative is and disregards the other conditions that are required to achieve CJ. There can still be a blatant violation of CJ if the alternative or fallback position (and hence workers' bargaining power) is weak. It suffices to say that the alternative must be socially acceptable. Full employment is usually a sufficient guarantee, and involuntary unemployment the primary threat, to CJ. The duty to work, the need to resume work as soon as possible, the threat of a cut in benefits, and the stigmas attached to benefits under a conditional scheme are factors that are very likely to impair the conditions of CJ or hamper the market forces that bring about CJ. The more the present welfare state is moving away from generous welfare provisions towards an austere workfare scheme, the more serious this danger becomes. The advantage of a BI scheme is that by providing unconditional access to subsistence income to all, without means- or work-test, it precludes coercive pressure on the (un)employed to take jobs at rates of pay below what would be required on grounds of CJ. This has far-reaching consequences for the degree of CJ that can be attained in the end: although the positive correlation between good jobs and pay levels is not eliminated, it will probably become much lower.