Classical and empirical negation in subintuitionistic logic

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    Giovanna Corsi (1987) and Greg Restall (1994) investigate propositional subintuitionistic logics that result by weakening the frame conditions of the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. Both Corsi and Restall confine their attention to the standard intuitionistic language. In this paper we consider two negation expansions of subintuitionistic logic, one by classical negation and the other with by what has been dubbed "empirical" negation. We provide an axiomatization of each expansion and show them sound and strongly complete. We conclude with some final remarks, including avenues for future research.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationAdvances in Modal Logic
    Editors Lev Beklemishev, Stéphane Demri, András Máté
    PublisherCollege Publications
    Pages217-235
    Volume11
    ISBN (Print)978-1-84890-201-5
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

    Keywords

    • Subintuitionistic logic
    • intuitionistic logic
    • classical negation
    • empiricalnegation

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Classical and empirical negation in subintuitionistic logic'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this