TY - JOUR
T1 - Choosing a partner for social exchange: Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness
AU - Fehrler, Sebastian
AU - Przepiorka, Wojtek
PY - 2016/9/1
Y1 - 2016/9/1
N2 - People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.
AB - People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.
KW - Corporate social responsibility
KW - Costly signaling
KW - Electoral competition
KW - Partner choice
KW - Social preferences
KW - Trust
KW - Trustworthiness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978422627&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84978422627
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 129
SP - 157
EP - 171
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -